Wi-Fi (802.11) networks have become an essential part of our daily lives; hence, their security is of utmost importance. However, Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3), the latest security certification for 802.11 standards, has recently been shown to be vulnerable to several attacks. In this paper, we first describe the attacks on WPA3 networks that have been reported in prior work; additionally, we show that a deauthentication attack and a beacon flood attack, known to be possible on a WPA2 network, are still possible with WPA3. We launch and test all the above (a total of nine) attacks using a testbed that contains an enterprise Access Point (AP) and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Our experimental results show that the AP is vulnerable to eight out of the nine attacks and the IDS is unable to detect any of them. We propose a design for a signature-based IDS, which incorporates techniques to detect all the above attacks. Also, we implement these techniques on our testbed and verify that our IDS is able to successfully detect all the above attacks. We provide schemes for mitigating the impact of the above attacks once they are detected. We make the code to perform the above attacks as well as that of our IDS publicly available, so that it can be used for future work by the research community at large.
翻译:Wi-Fi(802.11)网络已成为我们日常生活的重要组成部分;因此,它们的安全是最重要的。然而,Wi-Fi(WPA3)网络的无线保护接入3号(WPA3)最近显示,802.11标准的最新安全证书很容易受到几起袭击。我们首先在本文中描述了先前工作中报道的对WPA3网络的袭击;此外,我们还表明,WPA2网络上已知可能发生的一次校正攻击和一次信标洪水袭击仍然有可能。我们利用一个测试台,发射和测试上述所有袭击(总共9次),其中包括一个企业接入点和入侵探测系统(IDS)。我们的实验结果表明,AP在9次袭击中,8次是易受攻击的,而IDS无法探测其中的任何一次。我们建议设计一个基于签名的IDS,其中含有检测上述所有袭击的技术。我们还在测试台上应用这些技术,并核实我们的IDS能够成功检测所有上述袭击(共9次)。我们提供了减轻上述袭击影响的计划,我们提供在前面进行大规模袭击的系统研究后,一旦发现,我们就可以进行大规模攻击的IDS,即能进行。