Modeling and control of epidemics such as the novel Corona virus have assumed paramount importance at a global level. A natural and powerful dynamical modeling framework to use in this context is a continuous time Markov decision process (CTMDP) that encompasses classical compartmental paradigms such as the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. The challenges with CTMDP based models motivate the need for a more efficient approach and the mean field approach offers an effective alternative. The mean field approach computes the collective behavior of a dynamical system comprising numerous interacting nodes (where nodes represent individuals in the population). This paper (a) presents an overview of the mean field approach to epidemic modeling and control and (b) provides a state-of-the-art update on recent advances on this topic. Our discussion in this paper proceeds along two specific threads. The first thread assumes that the individual nodes faithfully follow a socially optimal control policy prescribed by a regulatory authority. The second thread allows the individual nodes to exhibit independent, strategic behavior. In this case, the strategic interaction is modeled as a mean field game and the control is based on the associated mean field Nash equilibria. In this paper, we start with a discussion of modeling of epidemics using an extended compartmental model - SIVR and provide an illustrative example. We next provide a review of relevant literature, using a mean field approach, on optimal control of epidemics, dealing with how a regulatory authority may optimally contain epidemic spread in a population. Following this, we provide an update on the literature on the use of the mean field game based approach in the study of epidemic spread and control. We conclude the paper with relevant future research directions.
翻译:摘要:在全球范围内,新型冠状病毒等传染病的建模与控制已经变得至关重要。连续时间马尔可夫决策过程(CTMDP)是在此情境下使用的自然而强大的动态建模框架,它包括了经典隔离模型,例如易感-感染-康复(SIR)模型。但CTMDP模型也带来了挑战,需要更高效的方法。均值场方法提供了有效的替代方案,其计算了包含大量相互作用节点的动态系统的集体行为(其中节点代表人口中的个人)。本文(a)概述了使用均值场方法进行疫情建模和控制,并(b)提供了关于此主题的最新进展。我们在本文中讨论了两个特定的模型线索。第一个模型线索假定个体节点恭顺地遵循监管机构预定的社会最优控制策略。第二个模型线索允许个体节点表现出独立的战略行为。在这种情况下,战略交互被建模为均值场博弈,并且控制基于相关的均值场纳什均衡。我们将从扩展隔离模型-SIVR的角度开始讨论疫情建模,并提供一个示例。接下来,我们将使用均值场方法提供有关疫情最优控制的相关文献综述,讨论监管机构如何最优地控制人口中的疫情。之后,我们将介绍均值场博弈方法在研究疫情传播和控制方面的文献情况。最后,我们将就相关的未来研究方向进行总结。