This article discusses how the gap between early 5G network threat assessments and an adversarial Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) knowledge base for future use in the MITRE ATT\&CK threat modelling framework can be bridged. We identify knowledge gaps in the existing framework for key 5G technology enablers such as SDN, NFV, and 5G specific signalling protocols of the core network. We adopt a preemptive approach to identifying adversarial techniques which can be used to launch attacks on the 5G core network (5GCN) and map these to its components. Using relevant 5G threat assessments along with industry reports, we study how the domain specific techniques can be employed by APTs in multi-stage attack scenarios based on historic telecommunication network attacks and motivation of APT groups. We emulate this mapping in a preemptive fashion to facilitate a rigorous cyber risk assessment, support intrusion detection, and design defences based on common APT TTPs in a 5GCN.
翻译:本文讨论了5G网络威胁评估与对5G核心网络(5GCN)发动攻击的对抗性技术、技术、程序(TTP)知识库之间如何缩小未来用于MITRE ATT ⁇ CK威胁建模框架的知识库之间的差距,我们查明了5G关键技术促进器(如SDN、NFV和5G核心网络的具体信号协议)现有框架中的知识差距,我们采取了先发制人的办法,确定可用于对5G核心网络(5GCN)发动攻击的对抗性技术,并将这些技术与该技术的构成部分进行测绘。我们利用相关的5G威胁评估以及行业报告,研究在基于历史上的电信网络攻击和APT团体的动机的多阶段攻击情景下,防止酷刑协会如何利用特定领域技术。我们以先发制人的方式进行这种绘图,以促进严格的网络风险评估,支持入侵探测,并根据5GCN共同的APTTP设计防御系统。