The microservice bombshells that have been linked with the microservice expansion have altered the application architectures, offered agility and scalability in terms of complexity in security trade-offs. Feeble legacy-based perimeter-based policies are unable to offer safeguard to distributed workloads and temporary interaction among and in between the services. The article itself is a case on the need of the Zero Trust Security Model of micro services ecosystem, particularly, the fact that human and workloads require identity federation. It is proposed that the solution framework will be based on industry-standard authentication and authorization and end-to-end trust identity technologies, including Authorization and OpenID connect (OIDC), Authorization and OAuth 2.0 token exchange, and Authorization and SPIFFE/ SPIRE workload identities. Experimental evaluation is a unique demonstration of a superior security position of making use of a smaller attack surface, harmony policy enforcement, as well as interoperability across multi- domain environments. The research results overlay that the federated identity combined with the Zero Trust basics not only guarantee the rules relating to authentication and authorization but also fully complies with the latest DevSecOps standards of microservice deployment, which is automated, scaled, and resilient. The current project offers a stringent roadmap to the organizations that desire to apply Zero Trust in cloud-native technologies but will as well guarantee adherence and interoperability.
翻译:微服务架构的广泛采用已深刻改变了应用系统的构建方式,在带来敏捷性与可扩展性的同时,也引入了复杂的安全权衡挑战。传统的基于边界防护的安全策略难以有效保护分布式工作负载及服务间动态临时的交互行为。本文深入探讨了在微服务生态系统中实施零信任安全模型的必要性,重点论证了工作负载与人员身份联合认证的关键作用。我们提出了一套基于行业标准认证授权机制与端到端可信身份技术的解决方案框架,涵盖OpenID Connect(OIDC)协议、OAuth 2.0令牌交换规范以及SPIFFE/SPIRE工作负载身份体系。实验评估表明,该方案能显著提升安全态势:通过缩小攻击面、实现统一策略执行以及保障多域环境互操作性,展现出优越的安全防护能力。研究结果证实,身份联合机制与零信任原则的结合不仅确保了认证授权规则的可靠实施,而且完全符合现代DevSecOps标准对自动化、可扩展及弹性化微服务部署的要求。本研究为组织在云原生技术栈中实施零信任安全提供了严谨的技术路线图,同时保障了合规性与系统间互操作能力。