In the last few years, a countless number of permissioned blockchain solutions have been proposed, with each one to claim that it revolutionizes the way of the transaction processing along with the security and privacy preserving mechanisms that it provides. Hyperledger Fabric is one of the most popular permissioned blockchain architectures that has made a significant impact on the market. However, there are only few papers of finding architectural risks regarding the security and the privacy preserving mechanisms of Hyperledger Fabric. This paper separates the attack surface of the blockchain platform into four components, namely, consensus, chaincode, network and privacy preserving mechanisms, in all of which an attacker (from inside or outside the network) can exploit the platform's design and gain access to or misuse the network. In addition, we highlight the appropriate counter-measures that can be taken in each component to address the corresponding risks and provide a significantly secure and enhanced privacy preserving Fabric network. We hope that by bringing this paper into light, we can aid developers to avoid security flaws and implementations that can be exploited by attackers but also to motivate further research to harden the platform's security and the client's privacy.
翻译:在过去几年里,提出了无数得到允许的连锁安全解决方案,每个文件都声称它使交易处理方式及其提供的安全和隐私保护机制发生革命性的变化。超利器法布里奇是最受欢迎的、对市场有重大影响的连锁结构之一。然而,在超利器法布里奇的安全和隐私保护机制方面,只有很少的文件可以找到建筑风险。本文将连锁平台的攻击面分为四个组成部分,即共识、链码、网络和隐私保护机制,攻击者(来自网络内外的)可以利用平台的设计,进入或滥用网络。此外,我们强调每个组成部分可以采取的适当的反制措施,以应对相应的风险,提供相当安全和强化的隐私保护Fabric网络。我们希望通过将这一文件曝光,我们可以帮助开发者避免袭击者可以利用的安全缺陷和执行,同时也能推动进一步的研究,使平台的安全和客户隐私更加坚硬。