Byzantine Agreement (BA) is one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing, and its communication complexity is an important efficiency metric. It is well known that quadratic communication is necessary for BA in the worst case due to a lower bound by Dolev and Reischuk. This lower bound has been shown to be tight for the unauthenticated setting with $f < n/3$ by Berman et al. but a considerable gap remains for the authenticated setting with $n/3 \le f < n/2$. This paper provides two results towards closing this gap. Both protocols have a quadratic communication complexity and have different trade-offs in resilience and assumptions. The first protocol achieves the optimal resilience of $f < n/2$ but requires a trusted setup for threshold signature. The second protocol achieves near optimal resilience $f \le (1/2 - \varepsilon)n$ in the standard PKI model.
翻译:拜占庭协议(BA)是分布式计算中最根本的问题之一,其通信复杂性是一个重要的效率衡量标准,众所周知,由于Dolev和Reischuk约束较低,在最坏的情况下BA必须进行四边通信,因为Dolev和Reischuk约束较低,而Berman等人以美元 < n/3美元表示,这一较低边框对于未经认证的设置而言是紧凑的,但对于以$/3\le f < n/2美元表示的认证设置而言,还存在相当大的差距。本文为弥合这一差距提供了两个结果。两个协议都具有四边通信复杂性,在复原力和假设方面有着不同的权衡。第一个协议实现了f < n/2美元的最大弹性,但需要为签署阈值设定一个可信赖的设置。第二个协议在标准的PKI模型中实现了接近最佳的复原力$f\le(1/2 -\ varepsilon)n。