公共项目创新激励机制研究：基于不完全契约动态性的视角

项目名称： 公共项目创新激励机制研究：基于不完全契约动态性的视角

项目编号： No.71302101

项目类型： 青年科学基金项目

立项/批准年度： 2014

项目学科： 管理科学

项目作者： 陈斌

作者单位： 中山大学

项目金额： 20万元

中文摘要： 无论是国内政策还是全球趋势，近年来都鼓励私人部门积极参与公共项目的设计、建设与运营。因此，研究私人部门参与公共品提供的创新激励机制具有重要意义。不仅要鼓励其参与，还要调动他们进行各种创新的积极性，约束其不当的市场化行为。我们将结合公共项目创新与转轨经济的特点，建立基于任务复杂关联与不完全契约动态演进的多任务委托-代理模型，分析与比较各种激励机制下创新投入的效率，研究最优激励创新的契约结构。在理论模型研究的基础上，我们将提出可供检验的随机结构方程模型，并运用亚洲开发银行关于中国36 个城市公共项目施工、运营与服务质量调查的数据进行实证检验。因此，这一课题的成果将发展有关公共项目创新激励机制的理论与实证的研究。

中文关键词： 政府企业合营模式；不完全契约；创新机制；结构方程模型；动态委托代理模型

英文摘要： In the real life public projects, not all the responsibilities could be stipulated in a simple contract. Particularly, the contract may remain incomplete throughout the interaction between the principal and the agents; hence, organization design and control rights matter in such a scenario. This issue is especially relevant in transition economy. Public-private partnership is a novel mode of arranging the collaboration between the governmental agencies and the private firms to deliver public services. In a typical PPP project, a single firm takes charge of all involved tasks, such as building and maintaining the facility; moreover, the control rights are kept in the hand of the private firm. In this research project, we will reexamine the proper scope of PPPs, and investigate the optimal arrangement regarding bundling versus unbundling and private ownership versus public ownership. In a dynamic principal-agnet model, we assume that the innovative activity in the building stage has impacts on, among other things, the subsequent operational cost. The novelty is that we relax the nature of task interdependence and study different contractual frameworks. The general insight is that given limitation in contractibility, contrary to common sense, complementarity between tasks favors unbundling over bundling. Moreover,

英文关键词： Public-Private-Partnership；Incomplete Contract；Innovation Mechanism；Structual Model；Dynamic Principal-agent Model