Evolving attacks on the vulnerabilities of the computing systems demand novel defense strategies to keep pace with newer attacks. This report discusses previous works on side-channel attacks (SCAs) and defenses for cache-targeted and physical proximity attacks. We then discuss the proposed Entropy-Shield as a defense against timing SCAs, and explain how we can extend the same to hardware-based implementations of crypto applications as "Entropy-Shield for FPGA". We then discuss why we want to build newer attacks with the hope of coming up with better defense strategies.
翻译:对计算机系统脆弱性的攻击不断演变,需要新的防御战略来跟上更新的攻击。本报告讨论了先前关于侧道攻击和缓冲目标攻击和物理近距离攻击的防御工作。然后我们讨论了拟议中的Entropy-Shield作为防范时间性攻击的防御方法,并解释了我们如何能像“FPGA的Entropy-Shield”那样将加密应用的硬件应用推广到“FPGA的Entropy-Shield ” 。然后我们讨论了为什么我们希望制定更好的防御战略来制造更新的攻击。