The spread of ransomware continues to cause devastation and is a major concern for the security community. An often-used technique against this threat is the use of honey (or canary) files, which serve as ``trip wires'' to detect ransomware in its early stages. However, in our analysis of ransomware samples from the wild, we discovered that attackers are well-aware of these traps, and newer variants use several evasive strategies to bypass traditional honey files. Hence, we present the design of SentryFS - a specialized file system that strategically ``sprays'' specially-crafted honey files across the file system. The canaries are generated using Natural Language Processing (NLP) and the content and the metadata is constantly updated to make the canaries appear more attractive for smarter ransomware that is selective in choosing victim files. Furthermore, to assist with the management of the honey files, SentryFS connects with an anti-ransomware web service to download the latest intelligence on novel ransomware strategies to update the canaries. Finally, as a contingency, SentryFS also leverages file clones to prevent processes from writing to files directly in the event a highly stealthy ransomware goes undetected. In this case, the ransomware encrypts the clones rather than the actual files, leaving users' data unmodified. An AI agent then assigns a suspicion score to the write activity so that users can approve/discard the changes. As an early-warning system, the proposed design might help mitigate the problem of ransomware.
翻译:赎金软件的传播继续造成破坏,是安全界的主要关切。一种经常用来对付这种威胁的方法是使用蜂蜜(或金丝雀)文件,作为“铁丝网”在早期阶段检测赎金软件。然而,在分析来自野生的赎金软件样本时,我们发现袭击者非常了解这些陷阱,而较新的变种则使用几种规避策略绕过传统的蜂蜜文件。因此,我们展示了“哨兵FS——一个专门的文件系统的设计,在文件系统中战略性地“喷射”专门制作的蜂蜜文件。用“金丝雀”制作的金丝雀文件,在早期阶段用来检测赎金软件。在分析来自野生的赎金软件样本时,我们发现袭击者非常了解这些陷阱,而较新的变种者则使用一些规避传统蜂蜜软件的网络服务来下载关于新式赎金软件的最新情报,以更新罐盒。最后,Sentrifers还利用“金丝雀”文件复制内容和元数据元数据不断更新,从而避免对赎金用户进行快速交易,因此,可以直接进行交易。