The North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) public-private Space Asset Supply Chain (SASC) currently exhibits significant cybersecurity gaps. It is well-established that data obtained from space assets is fundamental to NATO, as they allow for the facilitation of its missions, self-defence and effective deterrence of its adversaries. Any hostile cyber operation, suspending control over a space asset, severely impacts both NATO missions and allied Member States national security. This threat is exacerbated by NATOs mostly unregulated cyber SASC. Hence, this thesis answers a twofold research question: a) What are current cybersecurity gaps along NATOs global SASC; and b) How can NATO and its allied Member States gain greater control over such gaps to safeguard the supply of NATO mission-critical information? An ontological field study is carried out by conducting nineteen semi-structured interviews with high-level representatives from relevant public, private and academic organizations. This research was undertaken in collaboration with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia. This thesis concludes that current cybersecurity gaps along NATOs SASC are caused by cyber vulnerabilities such as legacy systems or the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology. Inadequate cyber SASC management is caused by hindrances such as misaligned classification levels and significant understaffing. On this basis, NATO should consider two major collaboration initiatives: a) Raising Awareness throughout the whole of the NATO system, and b) Pushing forward the creation of regulation through a standardized security framework on SASC cybersecurity. Doing so would enable NATO and its Member States to recognise cyberthreats to mission-critical data early on along its cyber SASC, and thus increase transparency, responsibility, and liability.
翻译:北大西洋条约组织(北约)公私营空间资产供应链(SASC)目前存在巨大的网络安全差距,从空间资产获得的数据对北约至关重要,因为这可以促进北约的任务、自卫和有效威慑对手。任何敌对的网络行动,暂停对空间资产的控制,严重影响北约特派团和盟国国家安全。这一威胁因北约大多不受管制的网络空间资产供应链(SSC)而加剧。因此,本论文回答一个双重研究问题:(a) 目前北约全球SASC之间的网络安全差距是什么;以及(b) 北约及其盟国如何对这些差距进行更大的控制,以保障北约对北约至关重要的信息的供应?进行一项实地研究,与相关公共、私人和学术组织的高级别代表进行九次半结构性访谈,中止对空间资产的控制,严重影响北约特派团及其盟国国家安全。 与北约合作网络安全网络合作英才中心(CCDCOE)合作在爱沙尼亚塔林(Tallininn)的网络安全网络安全框架方面,目前与北约的网络安全差距差距在于网络安全的弱点,例如遗留系统或北约关键信息的提供,因此,在北约的网络安全战略安全保密性管理方面,因此,必须进行重大的合作。