This paper presents a few observations about pro-Kremlin propaganda between 2015 and early 2021 with a dataset from the East Stratcom Task Force (ESTF), which is affiliated with the European Union (EU) but working independently from it. Instead of focusing on misinformation and disinformation, the observations are motivated by classical propaganda research and the ongoing transformation of media systems. According to the tentative results, (i) the propaganda can be assumed to target both domestic and foreign audiences. Of the countries and regions discussed, (ii) Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and within Europe, Germany, Poland, and the EU have been the most frequently discussed. Also other conflict regions such as Syria have often appeared in the propaganda. In terms of longitudinal trends, however, (iii) most of these discussions have decreased in volume after the digital tsunami in 2016, although the conflict in Ukraine seems to have again increased the intensity of pro-Kremlin propaganda. Finally, (iv) the themes discussed align with state-centric war propaganda and conflict zones, although also post-truth themes frequently appear; from conspiracy theories via COVID-19 to fascism -- anything goes, as is typical to propaganda.
翻译:本文对2015年至2021年初亲克里姆林党的宣传发表了一些意见,并附有来自东斯特拉特com工作队(ESTF)的数据集,该工作队隶属于欧洲联盟(欧盟),但独立运作。观察不是侧重于误导和虚假信息,而是受传统宣传研究和媒体系统不断转型的驱动。根据初步结果,(一) 宣传可以假定针对国内外受众。在讨论的国家和地区中,(二) 俄罗斯、乌克兰、美国和欧洲、德国、波兰和欧盟是讨论最多的国家和地区。此外,叙利亚等其他冲突地区也经常出现在宣传中。然而,从长期趋势看,(三) 大多数这些讨论在2016年数字海啸后数量有所减少,尽管乌克兰的冲突似乎再次增加了亲克里姆林宣传的强度。最后,(四) 讨论的主题与以国家为中心的战争宣传和冲突地区相一致,尽管也经常出现真相后的主题;从通过COVID-19阴谋理论到法西斯主义 -- -- 任何情况都是典型的宣传。