The paper develops a theory of power for delegable proxy voting systems. We define a power index able to measure the influence of both voters and delegators. Using this index, which we characterize axiomatically, we extend an earlier game-theoretic model by incorporating power-seeking behavior by agents. We analytically study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in such a model. Finally, by means of simulations, we study the effect of relevant parameters on the emergence of power inequalities in the model.
翻译:该文件为可被证明的代理投票系统发展了权力理论。 我们定义了能够衡量选民和立法者影响的权力指数。 我们用这个指数(这个指数是我们不折不扣的特征)扩展了一个早期的游戏理论模型,将代理人的寻求权力行为纳入其中。 我们分析研究在这样一个模型中是否存在纯战略Nash 平衡。 最后,我们通过模拟,研究相关参数对模型中权力不平等的出现的影响。