To make accurate inferences in an interactive setting, an agent must not confuse passive observation of events with having participated in causing those events. The do operator formalises interventions so that we may reason about their effect. Yet there exist at least two pareto optimal mathematical formalisms of general intelligence in an interactive setting which, presupposing no explicit representation of intervention, make maximally accurate inferences. We examine one such formalism. We show that in the absence of an operator, an intervention can still be represented by a variable. Furthermore, the need to explicitly represent interventions in advance arises only because we presuppose abstractions. The aforementioned formalism avoids this and so, initial conditions permitting, representations of relevant causal interventions will emerge through induction. These emergent abstractions function as representations of one`s self and of any other object, inasmuch as the interventions of those objects impact the satisfaction of goals. We argue (with reference to theory of mind) that this explains how one might reason about one`s own identity and intent, those of others, of one's own as perceived by others and so on. In a narrow sense this describes what it is to be aware, and is a mechanistic explanation of aspects of consciousness.
翻译:为了在互动环境中作出准确的推论,代理人不得将被动观察事件与参与制造事件混为一谈。操作者将干预正规化,以便我们可以解释其效果。然而,在互动环境中,一般情报至少有两种最理想的数学形式,假定没有明确的干预,作出最准确的推论。我们审视了这种形式主义。我们发现,在没有操作者的情况下,干预仍然可以用变数来代表。此外,明确代表事先干预的必要性之所以出现,只是因为我们假定了抽象性。上述形式主义避免了这一点,因此,在初步条件允许的情况下,有关因果干预的表述将通过感应出现。这些新出现的抽象主义作用是自我和任何其他物体的表达,因为这些物体的干预影响着目标的满意度。我们争论(提到思想理论),这解释了一个人本身的身份和意图、其他人的身份和意图、他人本身的特征和意图,以及他人对自身的认识。在狭小的意义上,它描述了认识和认识的方面。