In this paper, a transmission-distribution systems flexibility market is introduced, in which system operators (SOs) jointly procure flexibility from different systems to meet their needs (balancing and congestion management) using a common market. This common market is, then, formulated as a cooperative game aiming at identifying a stable and efficient split of costs of the jointly procured flexibility among the participating SOs to incentivize their cooperation. The non-emptiness of the core of this game is then mathematically proven, implying the stability of the game and the naturally-arising incentive for cooperation among the SOs. Several cost allocation mechanisms are then introduced, while characterizing their mathematical properties. Numerical results focusing on an interconnected system (composed of the IEEE 14-bus transmission system and the Matpower 18-bus, 69-bus, and 141-bus distributions systems) showcase the cooperation-induced reduction in system-wide flexibility procurement costs, and identifies the varying costs borne by different SOs under various cost allocations methods.
翻译:在本文中,引入了传输分配系统灵活市场,系统操作员从不同的系统共同获得灵活性,以便利用共同市场满足其需要(平衡和拥挤管理),然后将这一共同市场设计成合作游戏,目的是确定共同采购的灵活性在参与的战略目标之间稳定、高效地分摊费用,以激励其合作,然后从数学上证明这一游戏的核心并非空虚,意味着游戏的稳定性和自然增加的促进战略目标之间合作的动力。随后引入了几种成本分配机制,同时说明其数学特性。侧重于一个相互关联的系统(由IEEE 14-Bus传输系统和Matpower 18-Bus、69-Bus和141-Bus分配系统组成)的数值结果展示了全系统灵活采购费用的合作导致的减少,并确定了不同战略目标在各种成本分配方法下承担的不同成本。