It is well-known that Microsoft Word/Excel compatible documents or PDF files can contain malicious content. LaTeX files are unfortunately no exception either. LaTeX users often include third-party codes through sources or packages (.sty or .cls files). But those packages can execute malicious commands on the users' system, in order to capture sensitive information or to perform denial of service attacks. Checkoway et al. [3] were the first to warn LaTeX users of these threats. Collaborative cloud-based LaTeX editors and services compiling LaTeX sources are particularly concerned. In this paper, we have created a LaTeX package that collects system data and hides them inside the PDF file produced by the target. Then, we have measured what can be recovered by hackers using malicious LaTeX file on online services, and which measures those services have enforced to thwart the threats. Services defend themselves using sandbox or commands restrictions. Commands restrictions are more difficult to setup and we found one service (PMLatex) which is too permissive.
翻译:众所周知, 微软 Word/ Excel 兼容文档或 PDF 文件可能包含恶意内容。 不幸的是, LaTeX 文件也不例外。 LaTeX 用户通常通过源或包(.sty 或.cls 文件)包括第三方代码。 但是,这些软件包可以在用户系统中执行恶意指令, 以便捕捉敏感信息或拒绝服务攻击。 Chicoway et al. [3] 是第一个警告 LaTeX 用户这些威胁的用户的。 LaTeX 协作云型编辑和服务编辑和编辑汇编 LaTeX 源也特别关切。 在本文中, 我们创建了一个 LaTeX 软件包, 收集系统数据, 并将数据隐藏在目标生成的 PDF 文件内。 然后, 我们测量了黑客利用恶意 LaTeX 文件在网上服务中可以回收什么, 以及这些服务为挫败威胁而强制采取的措施。 服务使用沙箱或命令限制来保护自己。 命令限制更难设置, 我们发现一个过于宽松的服务( PMLatex ) 。