During the past few years, mostly as a result of the GDPR and the CCPA, websites have started to present users with cookie consent banners. These banners are web forms where the users can state their preference and declare which cookies they would like to accept, if such option exists. Although requesting consent before storing any identifiable information is a good start towards respecting the user privacy, yet previous research has shown that websites do not always respect user choices. Furthermore, considering the ever decreasing reliance of trackers on cookies and actions browser vendors take by blocking or restricting third-party cookies, we anticipate a world where stateless tracking emerges, either because trackers or websites do not use cookies, or because users simply refuse to accept any. In this paper, we explore whether websites use more persistent and sophisticated forms of tracking in order to track users who said they do not want cookies. Such forms of tracking include first-party ID leaking, ID synchronization, and browser fingerprinting. Our results suggest that websites do use such modern forms of tracking even before users had the opportunity to register their choice with respect to cookies. To add insult to injury, when users choose to raise their voice and reject all cookies, user tracking only intensifies. As a result, users' choices play very little role with respect to tracking: we measured that more than 75% of tracking activities happened before users had the opportunity to make a selection in the cookie consent banner, or when users chose to reject all cookies.
翻译:在过去几年里,主要是由于GDPR和CCPA的结果,网站开始向用户展示Cookie同意的标语。这些标语是网络格式,用户可以声明其偏好,并宣布他们愿意接受哪个饼干,如果存在这种选项。虽然在储存任何可识别信息之前请求同意是尊重用户隐私的良好开端,但先前的研究显示,网站并不总是尊重用户的选择。此外,考虑到跟踪者对饼干的依赖性不断下降,浏览器供应商通过屏蔽或限制第三方饼干来采取行动,我们预计会出现无国籍跟踪的世界,因为跟踪者或网站不使用饼干,或用户只是拒绝。在本文件中,我们探索网站是否使用更持久和复杂的跟踪形式来跟踪那些说不想看的用户。这种跟踪形式包括第一当事方身份的泄漏、身份同步和浏览器指纹。我们的研究结果表明,即使在用户有机会登记其对饼干的选择之前,网站确实使用这种现代的跟踪形式。我们发现,当用户选择提高自己的声音和拒绝使用饼干时,或者因为用户只是简单地拒绝接受任何饼干。在跟踪时,我们只能用一个小的标签来测量用户的选项。