We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is a remote sensor (e.g., a radar station) that can sense the evader's location upon a request from the pursuer and communicate that sensed location to the pursuer. The pursuer has a budget on the total number of sensing requests. The outcome of the game is determined by the sensing and motion strategies of the players. We obtain an equilibrium sensing strategy for the pursuer and an equilibrium motion strategy for the evader. We quantify the degradation in the pursuer's pay-off due to its sensing limitations.
翻译:我们考虑一类追逐-逃避微分博弈,其中逃避者可以持续了解追逐者的位置,而追逐者则不能反向得知逃避者的位置。有一个远程传感器(例如雷达站)可以在追逐者请求时感知逃避者的位置,并将其感测到的位置传达给追逐者。追逐者对总感知请求次数有预算。游戏的结果取决于玩家的感知和运动策略。我们获得了追逐者的均衡感知策略和逃避者的均衡运动策略。我们量化了追逐者由于感知限制而导致的收益损失。