This work investigates the problem of cache-aided content Secure and demand Private Linear Function Retrieval (SP-LFR), where three constraints are imposed on the system:(a) each user is interested in retrieving an arbitrary linear combination of the files in the server's library;(b) the content of the library must be kept secure from a wiretapper who obtains the signal sent by the server; and (c) no colluding subset of users together obtain information about the demands of the remaining users. A procedure is proposed to derive an SP-LFR scheme from a given Placement Delivery Array (PDA), which is known to give coded caching schemes with low subpacketization for systems with neither security nor privacy constraints. This procedure uses the superposition of security keys and privacy keys in both the cache placement and transmitted signal to guarantee content security and demand privacy, respectively. In particular, among all PDA-based SP-LFR schemes, the memory-load pairs achieved by the PDA describing the Maddah-Ali and Niesen's scheme are Pareto-optimal and have the lowest subpacketization. Moreover, the achieved load-memory tradeoff is optimal to within a constant multiplicative gap except for the small memory regime (i.e., when the cache size is between 1 and 2) and the number of files is smaller than the number of users. Remarkably, the memory-load tradeoff does not increase compared to the best known schemes that guarantee either only content security in all regimes or only demand privacy in regime mentioned above.
翻译:这项工作调查了缓存辅助内容安全和需求私用Linaar 函数检索问题,对该系统施加了三种限制:(a) 每个用户都有兴趣重新获取服务器图书馆文件任意线性组合;(b) 图书馆的内容必须从获得服务器发送的信号的窃听器中安全;(c) 没有一个串通的用户组群共同获得关于其余用户需求的信息。提议了一个程序,从一个给定的投放交付系统(PDA)中获取SP-LFR计划(SP-LFR),这三种限制是:(a) 每个用户都有兴趣重新获取服务器图书馆库中文件的任意线性线性组合;(b) 图书馆内容必须从获得服务器发送的信号的窃听器中安全;(c) 特别是,在所有基于PDADA SP-LFR 的用户组合中,只有描述Gaddah-Ali 和 Niesen 系统(PDA) 的存储系统(SPA-A) (SPA) (SPA) (SPA) (SPA) (SPA) (SP) (SP-L) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SPA) (SP) (SPA) (SP) (SP) (SPA) (SPA) (SPA) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (SP) (POL) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (PD) (P) (PD) (P) (PD) (PD) (PD) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (PD) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (PD) (P) (P) (P) (PD) (PD) (PD) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) (P