Most permissionless blockchain networks run on peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, which offer flexibility and decentralization at the expense of performance (e.g., network latency). Historically, this tradeoff has not been a bottleneck for most blockchains. However, an emerging host of blockchain-based applications (e.g., decentralized finance) are increasingly sensitive to latency; users who can reduce their network latency relative to other users can accrue (sometimes significant) financial gains. In this work, we initiate the study of strategic latency reduction in blockchain P2P networks. We first define two classes of latency that are of interest in blockchain applications. We then show empirically that a strategic agent who controls only their local peering decisions can manipulate both types of latency, achieving 60\% of the global latency gains provided by the centralized, paid service bloXroute, or, in targeted scenarios, comparable gains. Finally, we show that our results are not due to the poor design of existing P2P networks. Under a simple network model, we theoretically prove that an adversary can always manipulate the P2P network's latency to their advantage, provided the network experiences sufficient peer churn and transaction activity.
翻译:在P2P(P2P)网络上运行的多数没有许可证的连锁链网络,这些网络提供灵活性和权力下放,而以业绩为代价(例如网络延缓)。从历史上看,这种权衡对大多数连锁系统来说并不是一个瓶颈。然而,一个新兴的基于链链的应用程序(例如分散融资)对潜伏系统越来越敏感;能够减少与其他用户相比其网络的延缓度的用户可以累积(有时是相当大的)财政收益。在这项工作中,我们开始研究减少连锁P2P网络的战略延缓度。我们首先确定对连锁应用感兴趣的两类延缓度。我们从经验上表明,仅控制其本地对等决定的战略代理商能够操纵两种类型的延缓度,实现集中、付费服务布洛克斯罗韦特提供的全球延缓率收益的60 ⁇ ;或者在目标情景下可比收益。最后,我们证明我们的结果不是由于现有P2P网络设计不良造成的。在一个简单的网络模型下,我们理论上证明,一个仅控制其对等决定的网络能够操纵其足够的对等网络活动。