Google Chrome is the most popular Web browser. Users can customize it with extensions that enhance their browsing experience. The most well-known marketplace of such extensions is the Chrome Web Store (CWS). Developers can upload their extensions on the CWS, but such extensions are made available to users only after a vetting process carried out by Google itself. Unfortunately, some malicious extensions bypass such checks, putting the security and privacy of downstream browser extension users at risk. Here, we scrutinize the extent to which automated mechanisms reliant on supervised machine learning (ML) can be used to detect malicious extensions on the CWS. To this end, we first collect 7,140 malicious extensions published in 2017--2023. We combine this dataset with 63,598 benign extensions published or updated on the CWS before 2023, and we develop three supervised-ML-based classifiers. We show that, in a "lab setting", our classifiers work well (e.g., 98% accuracy). Then, we collect a more recent set of 35,462 extensions from the CWS, published or last updated in 2023, with unknown ground truth. We were eventually able to identify 68 malicious extensions that bypassed the vetting process of the CWS. However, our classifiers also reported >1k likely malicious extensions. Based on this finding (further supported with empirical evidence), we elucidate, for the first time, a strong concept drift effect on browser extensions. We also show that commercial detectors (e.g., VirusTotal) work poorly to detect known malicious extensions. Altogether, our results highlight that detecting malicious browser extensions is a fundamentally hard problem. This requires additional work both by the research community and by Google itself -- potentially by revising their approaches. In the meantime, we informed Google of our discoveries, and we release our artifacts.
翻译:Google Chrome是最流行的网络浏览器。用户可通过安装扩展程序来自定义浏览器功能以提升浏览体验。此类扩展程序最主要的市场是Chrome应用商店(CWS)。开发者可将扩展程序上传至CWS,但此类扩展需经过谷歌自身的审核流程后方可向用户开放。遗憾的是,部分恶意扩展程序能够绕过此类审查,从而危及下游浏览器扩展用户的安全与隐私。本文深入探究了基于监督机器学习(ML)的自动化机制在检测CWS恶意扩展方面的有效性。为此,我们首先收集了2017至2023年间发布的7,140个恶意扩展程序。我们将该数据集与2023年前在CWS发布或更新的63,598个良性扩展程序相结合,并开发了三种基于监督机器学习的分类器。实验表明,在"实验室环境"中,我们的分类器表现优异(例如准确率达98%)。随后,我们从CWS收集了35,462个于2023年发布或最后更新的扩展程序,其真实标签未知。我们最终识别出68个绕过CWS审核流程的恶意扩展。然而,我们的分类器同时标记出超过1,000个疑似恶意扩展。基于这一发现(并通过实证证据进一步验证),我们首次揭示了浏览器扩展领域存在的强烈概念漂移效应。此外,我们发现商业检测工具(如VirusTotal)对已知恶意扩展的检测效果欠佳。综合而言,我们的研究结果表明:检测恶意浏览器扩展本质上是一个极具挑战性的难题。这需要研究社区与谷歌公司共同投入更多工作——可能涉及对其现有方法的重新审视。目前,我们已将相关发现告知谷歌,并公开了本研究的实验数据与工具。