Metaverse as the next-generation Internet provides users with physical-virtual world interactions. To improve the quality of immersive experience, users access to Metaverse service providers (MSPs) and purchase bandwidth resource to reduce the communication latency of the Metaverse services. The MSPs decide selling price of the bandwidth resource to maximize the revenue. This leads to a joint user association and resource pricing problem between all users and MSPs. To tackle the problem, we formulate a Stackelberg game where the MSPs are game leaders and users are game followers. We resolve the Stackelberg equilibrium via the distributed and centralized approaches, according to different privacy requirements. In the distributed approach, the MSPs compete against each other to maximize the individual revenue, and a user selects an MSP in a probabilistic manner. The Stackelberg equilibrium is achieved in a privacy-friendly way. In the centralized approach, all MSPs and users accept the unified management and their strategies are instructed. The centralized approach acquires the superior decision-making performance but sacrifices the privacy of the game players. Finally, we provide numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our schemes.
翻译:作为下一代互联网的比喻,它为用户提供了物理虚拟世界互动。为了提高沉浸经验的质量,用户可以使用Metove服务供应商(MSPs)并购买带宽资源,以减少Metoveve服务的通信时间间隔。MSPs决定出售带宽资源的价格,以最大限度地增加收入。这导致了所有用户和MSPs之间的联合用户协会和资源定价问题。为了解决这一问题,我们制定了一个Stackelberg游戏游戏游戏的游戏,MSPs是游戏领袖和用户是游戏追随者。我们根据不同的隐私要求,通过分配和集中的办法解决Stackelberg平衡问题。在分配办法中,MSPs相互竞争,以尽量扩大个人收入,用户以稳健的方式选择MSP。Stackelberg均衡是以一种方便隐私的方式实现的。在集中办法中,所有MSPs和用户都接受统一管理,他们的战略是指示的。集中办法获得优异的决策性,但牺牲游戏玩家的隐私。最后,我们提供了数字结果,以显示我们计划的有效性和效率。