While existing security protocols were designed with a focus on the core network, the enhancement of the security of the B5G access network becomes of critical importance. Despite the strengthening of 5G security protocols with respect to LTE, there are still open issues that have not been fully addressed. This work is articulated around the premise that rethinking the security design bottom up, starting at the physical layer, is not only viable in 6G but importantly, arises as an efficient way to overcome security hurdles in novel use cases, notably massive machine type communications (mMTC), ultra reliable low latency communications (URLLC) and autonomous cyberphysical systems. Unlike existing review papers that treat physical layer security orthogonally to cryptography, we will try to provide a few insights of underlying connections. Discussing many practical issues, we will present a comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art in i) secret key generation from shared randomness, ii) the wiretap channel and fundamental limits, iii) authentication of devices using physical unclonable functions (PUFs), localization and multi-factor authentication, and, iv) jamming attacks at the physical layer. We finally conclude with the proposers' aspirations for the 6G security landscape, in the hyper-connectivity and semantic communications era.
翻译:虽然现有安全协议的设计以核心网络为重点,但加强B5G接入网络的安全变得至关重要。尽管加强了5GLTE安全协议,但仍有一些尚未完全解决的问题。这项工作的前提是:自下而上重新思考安全设计,从物理层开始,不仅在6G中是可行的,而且重要的是,从6G中产生的安全协议是克服新用途案件中安全障碍的有效方法,特别是大型机器类型通信、超可靠的低潜伏通信和自主网络物理系统。与现有关于物理层安全或对加密的5G安全协议不同,我们将试图对基本联系提供一些洞察。讨论许多实际问题,我们将全面审查从共同随机性产生的秘密钥匙生成(i),(ii) 窃听频道和基本限制,(iii) 使用物理无法调的功能认证装置(PUFs)、本地化和多功能认证,以及(iv) 将空间层的安全性攻击与空间层安全性攻击联系起来。