Automated market makers (AMMs) are one of the most prominent decentralized finance (DeFi) applications. AMMs allow users to trade different types of crypto-tokens, without the need to find a counter-party. There are several implementations and models for AMMs, featuring a variety of sophisticated economic mechanisms. We present a theory of AMMs. The core of our theory is an abstract operational model of the interactions between users and AMMs, which can be concretised by instantiating the economic mechanisms. We exploit our theory to formally prove a set of fundamental properties of AMMs, characterizing both structural and economic aspects. We do this by abstracting from the actual economic mechanisms used in implementations, and identifying sufficient conditions which ensure the relevant properties. Notably, we devise a general solution to the arbitrage problem, the main game-theoretic foundation behind the economic mechanisms of AMMs.
翻译:自动市场制造者(AMMS)是最为突出的分散化金融(DeFi)应用软件之一。 自动市场制造者(AMMS)允许用户交易不同类型的隐喻,而不必寻找反方。 单市场制造者(DIMS)有多种执行和模式,具有各种复杂的经济机制。 我们提出了一个反市场制造者理论。 我们理论的核心是用户与AMMs之间互动的抽象操作模式,可以通过经济机制的即时化而具体化。 我们利用我们的理论来正式证明AMMs的一套基本特性,将结构和经济方面定性。 我们这样做的方法是从实施中采用的实际经济机制中抽取出来,并找出确保相关特性的充足条件。 值得注意的是,我们设计了套利问题的一般解决办法,这是AMMs经济机制背后的主要游戏理论基础。