基于拍卖机制的认知异构网络中联合预编码与功率分配研究

项目名称： 基于拍卖机制的认知异构网络中联合预编码与功率分配研究

项目编号： No.61471135

项目类型： 面上项目

立项/批准年度： 2015

项目学科： 无线电电子学、电信技术

项目作者： 赵峰

作者单位： 玉林师范学院

项目金额： 95万元

中文摘要： 在认知异构网络中采用预编码与功率分配可以有效抑制非授权用户对授权用户的干扰和非授权用户之间的相互干扰，提高系统吞吐量。本项目将在认知异构网络中研究基于拍卖机制的认知系统联合预编码与功率分配，以最大化认知网络共享授权用户的频带时授权用户和认知系统各自的收益。我们拟从四个方面开展研究：第一，研究认知异构网络中以低功率节点为核心的多个认知系统和多个授权用户的频谱市场模型和竞价拍卖机制；第二，基于拍卖机制研究关于授权用户所忍受干扰、认知系统吞吐量的授权用户和认知系统的收益函数；第三，研究基于拍卖的认知系统联合预编码与功率分配纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性以及在买卖双方欺诈和勾结下的鲁棒性；第四，研究达到拍卖纳什均衡的认知系统联合预编码与功率分配算法及其收敛性能。本项目研究的联合预编码与功率分配算法兼顾异构网络中授权用户和非授权用户的利益，有利于认知异构网络中的联合预编码与功率分配技术走向实际应用。

中文关键词： 认知无线电；异构网；拍卖机制；纳什均衡

英文摘要： In cognitive Empowered heterogeneous networks (HetNets), joint precoding and power allocation can suppress the interference to the licensed user caused by unlicensed users and the inner-interference among unlicensed users, leading to a system throughput enhancement.This project studies joint precoding and power allocation in cognitive empowered heterogeneous networks via auction theory. We will study this topic from four aspects: First, we study the spectrum market model and the auction mechanism for the scenario of multiple cognitive systems with low power nodes and multiple licensed users under the construction of HetNets. Second, based on auction mechanisms we study the reward functions of licensed users and cognitive systems in terms of the interference endured by licensed users and the throughput of cognitive systems. Third, we study the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of joint precoding and power allocation in cognitive systems via game theory as well as the robustness under cheating and collusion. Forth, we study the joint precoding and beamforming algorithm in cognitive systems that can reach the Nash equilibirum of auction and its convergence. The proposed algorithm can balance the rewards of licensed and unlicensed users within the HetNets, which is beneficial for practical application of the joint precoding and power allocation technique in cognitive empowered HetNets.

英文关键词： cognitive radio;heterogeneous networks;auction mechanisms;Nash equilibrium