政府监管、现金股利承诺与公司行为

项目名称： 政府监管、现金股利承诺与公司行为

项目编号： No.71272100

项目类型： 面上项目

立项/批准年度： 2013

项目学科： 管理科学

项目作者： 王跃堂

作者单位： 南京大学

项目金额： 55万元

中文摘要： 近些年来,世界范围内都出现"股利消失"现象。针对此问题,中国证监会要求公司"首发公开上市"（IPO）必须对上市以后现金股利作出承诺，并在招股说明书中明确披露上市以后现金分红的比例与条件。在股票发行采用"核准制"的中国，该项政策势必会对资本市场产生重要影响，同时也为学术研究提供了难得的契机。本课题拟基于股利分配的代理问题理论与信号理论，通过多角度分析，重点研究：（1）现金股利承诺与证监会IPO审核之间关系；（2）现金股利承诺与IPO抑价之间关系；（3）现金股利承诺对公司行为产生的影响；（4）现金股利承诺与公司上市后未来长期业绩之间的关系。研究成果不仅能为资本市场政府监管提供政策后果与监管效率的经验证据，而且也能填补国内的学术空白，并为国际学术文献作出贡献。

中文关键词： 现金股利承诺；资源配置；公司行为；IPO抑价；长期业绩表现

英文摘要： The "dividend disappearance" phenomenon appears worldwide in recent years. To solve this problem, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) requires the "Initial Public Offerings"(IPO) companies to make the cash dividend commitment and disclosure the proportions and conditions of cash dividend in the prospectus. In stock issued "approval system", this policy not only has an important influence on the capital markets, but also provides a unique opportunity for academic research. Our project intends to base on the "dividend agent theory" and "dividend signal theory" and by multi-angle analysis ,focusing on: (1) the relationship between cash dividend commitment and CSRC IPO audit;(2) the relationship between cash dividend commitment and IPO underpricing;(3)the influence of cash dividend commitment on the behavior of company;(4) the relationship between cash dividend commitment and company's future long-term performance that after listing. The research results can not only provide empirical evidence about policy consequences and regulatory efficiency for government regulation of capital markets but also fill the bland of domestic academic, and contribute to the international academic literature.

英文关键词： Cash Dividend Commitment；Resource Allocation；Corporate behavior；IPO underpricing；Long-term Performance