In this work, we propose a novel protocol for secure three-party computation with an honest majority. For each AND gate, our protocol requires only two bits of communication in the online phase and two bits of communication in the offline phase. Also, only P2 and P3 are involved in the online phase. Our protocol is simulation-based secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and achieves privacy but not correctness in the presence of malicious adversaries. The best previously known construction in this setting requires three bits of communication per AND gate in the online phase and does not achieve constant communication rounds for P1. This makes our protocol especially interesting for cases where P1 can only communicate to the other parties with high latency. Additionally, our protocol can achieve circuit privacy against P3 if P1 and P2 also send bits for every XOR gate to P3. This property may be interesting to achieve a two-party computation where P3 only acts as an auxiliary party with no input and should not learn the computed function. Our protocol also supports the client-server model and works for both arithmetic and boolean circuits.
翻译:在这项工作中,我们提出了一个新颖的协议,用诚实的多数来安全地计算三方。 对于每一个和大门,我们的协议只需要在在线阶段进行两位通讯,而在离线阶段只需要两位通讯。此外,只有P2和P3参与在线阶段。我们的协议是在半诚实对手在场的情况下以模拟为基础的安全,在恶意对手在场的情况下实现隐私而不是正确性。在这个环境中,最有名的建筑需要每个和大门在在线阶段进行三位通讯,而没有实现P1的连续通信回合。这使得我们的协议特别有趣,因为P1只能与高度悬浮的其他各方进行通讯。此外,我们的协议可以实现P3的线路隐私,如果P1和P2也为每个XOR门发送比特到P3,那么我们的协议就可以实现双方计算,P3只能作为辅助方,没有输入,不应该学习计算功能。我们的协议还支持客户-服务器模型,并且同时进行算术和布林电路。