We consider the problem of covert communication over a state-dependent channel when the channel state is available either non-causally, causally, or strictly causally, either at the transmitter alone or at both transmitter and receiver. Covert communication with respect to an adversary, called "warden," is one in which, despite communication over the channel, the warden's observation remains indistinguishable from an output induced by innocent channel-input symbols. Covert communication involves fooling an adversary in part by a proliferation of codebooks; for reliable decoding at the legitimate receiver, the codebook uncertainty is typically removed via a shared secret key that is unavailable to the warden. In contrast to previous work, we do not assume the availability of a shared key at the transmitter and legitimate receiver. Instead, shared randomness is extracted from the channel state in a manner that keeps it secret from the warden, despite the influence of the channel state on the warden's output. When channel state is available at the transmitter and receiver, we derive the covert capacity region. When channel state is only available at the transmitter, we derive inner and outer bounds on the covert capacity. We provide examples for which the covert capacity is positive with knowledge of channel state information but is zero without it.
翻译:我们考虑的是,当频道状态不是因果、因果或完全是因果而存在时,在一个依赖国家的频道上进行秘密通信的问题,如果频道状态是非因果、因果或完全是因果的,或者单独在发射机上,或者在发射机和接收机上。对于一个叫作“向上”的对手,秘密通信是一个问题,尽管在频道上进行通信,典狱长的观察仍然无法与无害的频道输入符号产生的输出区分开来。秘密通信涉及部分由代码库的扩散来欺骗对手;对于在合法接收器上可靠的解码,代码库不确定性通常通过一个共同的秘密密钥来消除,而典狱长则无法使用。与以往的工作不同,我们并不假定在发射机和合法接收机上有一个共享的密钥。相反,从频道状态中抽取共享的随机性是让它与典狱长保持秘密的方式,尽管频道状态对监视器输出有影响。当发射机和接收机可用频道状态时,我们获取隐蔽能力区域。当频道状态仅供发射机使用时,我们从隐藏的内外部和外部约束,但没有隐藏能力。我们提供隐蔽能力的例子。我们提供隐蔽数据。