This study investigates general model-based incident handler's asymptotic behaviors in time against cyber attacks to control systems. The attacker's and the defender's dynamic decision making is modeled as an equilibrium of a dynamic signaling game. It is shown that the defender's belief on existence of an attacker converges over time for any attacker's strategy provided that the stochastic dynamics of the control system is known to the defender. This fact implies that the rational behavior of the attacker converges to a harmless action as long as the defender possesses an effective counteraction. The obtained result supports the powerful protection capability achieved by model-based defense mechanisms.
翻译:本研究调查了一般以模式为基础的事件处理者在应对网络攻击以控制系统时的无药可治的行为。攻击者和辩护者的动态决策模式是动态信号游戏的平衡,显示辩护人对攻击者存在的信念随着时间的推移,对任何攻击者的战略都趋于一致,只要辩护人知道控制系统的随机动态。这一事实意味着攻击者的理性行为只要辩护人拥有有效的反击行动,就会导致无害行动。获得的结果支持了以模型为基础的防御机制所实现的强大保护能力。