The advances of the Internet of Things (IoT) have had a fundamental impact and influence in sharping our rich living experiences. However, since IoT devices are usually resource-constrained, lightweight block ciphers have played a major role in serving as a building block for secure IoT protocols. In CHES 2015, SIMECK, a family of block ciphers, was designed for resource-constrained IoT devices. Since its publication, there have been many analyses on its security. In this paper, under the one bit-flip model, we propose a new efficient fault analysis attack on SIMECK ciphers. Compared to those previously reported attacks, our attack can recover the full master key by injecting faults into only a single round of all SIMECK family members. This property is crucial, as it is infeasible for an attacker to inject faults into different rounds of a SIMECK implementation on IoT devices in the real world. Specifically, our attack is characterized by exercising a deep analysis of differential trail between the correct and faulty immediate ciphertexts. Extensive simulation evaluations are conducted, and the results demonstrate the effectiveness and correctness of our proposed attack.
翻译:互联网“事物”的进步对我们丰富的生活经验产生了根本性的影响和影响,然而,由于互联网设备通常受到资源限制,轻量级的区块密码在作为安全的互联网协议的构件方面起着重要作用。在CHES 2015, SIMECK这个由区块密码组成的大家庭,是为资源缺乏的互联网设备设计的。自其出版以来,对其安全性进行了许多分析。在本文中,根据一个小翻版模型,我们提议对SIMECK密码进行新的高效过失分析攻击。与以前报告的这些攻击相比,我们的攻击能够通过将断层注入所有SIMECK家庭成员的单轮中来恢复全部主键。这种财产至关重要,因为攻击者无法将断层注入不同回合的SIMECK在现实世界中实施IOT装置的情况。具体地说,我们的攻击的特点是对正确和错误的直截截面密码之间的差别进行了深入分析。我们进行的广泛模拟的结果和拟议的攻击的正确性。