Smart grids are vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to evaluate the variations caused by an attacker on the power measurements. Adversaries can gain financial benefits through the manipulation of the meters of smart grids. On the other hand, there is a defender that tries to maintain the accuracy of the meters. A zero-sum game is used to model the interactions between the attacker and defender. In this paper, two different defenders are used and the effectiveness of each defender in different scenarios is evaluated. Multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs) and traditional state estimators are the two defenders that are studied in this paper. The utility of the defender is also investigated in adversary-aware and adversary-unaware situations. Our simulations suggest that the utility which is gained by the adversary drops significantly when the MLP is used as the defender. It will be shown that the utility of the defender is variant in different scenarios, based on the defender that is being used. In the end, we will show that this zero-sum game does not yield a pure strategy, and the mixed strategy of the game is calculated.
翻译:智能网格容易受到网络攻击。 本文提出一种游戏理论方法, 来评估攻击者对电量测量造成的变异。 反向者可以通过操纵智能网格的仪表获得经济利益。 另一方面, 还有一个捍卫者试图保持仪表的准确性。 使用零和游戏来模拟攻击者与捍卫者之间的互动。 在本文中, 使用两种不同的维权者, 并评估每个维权者在不同情况下的效能 。 多层透视器( MLPs) 和传统国家估计者是本文中研究的两个维权者 。 维权者的效用也是在敌方和敌人- 软件情况下调查的。 我们的模拟显示, 当将 MLP 用作维权者时, 对手的效用会大幅下降。 将会显示, 维权者在不同情况下的效用是不同的, 以正在使用的维权者为基础。 最后, 我们将显示, 这个零和国的游戏不会产生纯净策略, 并且游戏的混合策略是计算出来的 。