Recently, major progress has been made towards the realisation of quantum internet to enable a broad range of classically intractable applications. These applications such as delegated quantum computation require running a secure identification protocol between a low-resource and a high-resource party to provide secure communication. In this work, we propose two identification protocols based on the emerging hardware secure solutions, the quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs). The first protocol allows a low-resource party to prove its identity to a high-resource party and in the second protocol, it is vice-versa. Unlike existing identification protocols based on Quantum Read-out PUFs which rely on the security against a specific family of attacks, our protocols provide provable exponential security against any Quantum Polynomial-Time adversary with resource-efficient parties. We provide a comprehensive comparison between the two proposed protocols in terms of resources such as quantum memory and computing ability required in both parties as well as the communication overhead between them.
翻译:最近,在实现量子互联网方面取得了重大进步,使大量传统棘手的应用成为可能,例如委托量子计算等应用需要在一个低资源方和高资源方之间执行安全的身份鉴定协议,以便提供安全的通信。在这项工作中,我们根据新出现的硬件安全解决方案提出了两项身份鉴定协议,即量子物理不相容功能(qPUFs ) 。第一项议定书允许一个低资源方证明其对高资源方的身份,而第二项议定书则允许这种低资源方证明其在高资源方和第二项议定书中的身份。与以量子读出点药为基础的现有身份鉴定协议不同,这些协议依赖于针对特定攻击家庭的安全性,我们的协议提供了针对任何量子多时对手与资源效率方的可证实的指数安全性保证。我们全面比较了两个拟议协议在双方所需的量子内存和计算能力等资源方面以及它们之间的通信管理费用。