The number of registered SIM cards and active mobile phone subscribers in Zambia in 2020 surpassed the population of the country. This clearly shows that mobile phones in Zambia have become part of everyday life easing not only the way people communicate but also the way people perform financial transactions owing to the integration of mobile phone systems with financial payment systems. This development has not come without a cost. Cyberattackers, using various social engineering techniques have jumped onto the bandwagon to defraud unsuspecting users. Considering the aforesaid, this paper presents a high-order analytical approach towards mobile phone-based social engineering cyberattacks (phishing, SMishing, and Vishing) in Zambia which seek to defraud benign victims. This paper presents a baseline study to reiterate the problem at hand. Furthermore, we devise an attack model and an evaluation framework and ascertain the most prevalent types of attack. We also present a logistic regression analysis in the results section to conclude the most prevalent mobile phone-based type of social engineering attack. Based on the artifacts and observed insights, we suggest recommendations to mitigate these emergent social engineering cyberattacks.
翻译:2020年,赞比亚注册的SIM卡和活跃移动电话用户的数量超过了该国人口,这清楚地表明赞比亚的移动电话已成为日常生活的一部分,不仅缓解了人们的交流方式,而且缓解了人们因移动电话系统与金融支付系统相结合而进行金融交易的方式。这一发展并非没有成本。网络攻击者利用各种社会工程技术跳上宽带网以欺骗不知情的用户。考虑到上述情况,本文件对赞比亚的移动电话社会工程网络攻击(钓鱼、SMishing和Vishing)进行了高度分析,试图欺骗良性受害者。本文介绍了一项基线研究,以重申手头的问题。此外,我们设计了一个攻击模型和评价框架,并确定最普遍的攻击类型。我们还在成果部分进行了后勤回归分析,以结束最普遍的基于移动电话的社会工程攻击类型。根据手工艺和观察的洞察,我们提出了减轻这些突发的社会工程网络攻击的建议。