eSignatures ensure data's authenticity, non-repudiation, and integrity. EU's eIDAS regulation specifies, e.g., advanced and qualified (QES) eSignatures. While eSignatures' concrete legal effects depend on the individual case, QESs constitute the highest level of technical protection and authenticity under eIDAS. QESs are based on a qualified certificate issued by a qualified trust service provider (QTSP). Despite legal requirements, technically, a QTSP represents a single point of failure. Contrary, privacy-preserving collaborative computations (P2C2s) have become increasingly practical in recent years; yet lacking an extensive investigation on potential integrations in the QES landscape. We perform a threat analysis on the QES-creation process of Austria's national eID, using STRIDE and a DREAD-like model to extract requirement challenges (RCs) primarily related to: (1) Distributed Service Robustness, (2) Agile Crypto Deployment, and (3) Active User Involvement. To address these RCs, we present QoeSiGN, utilizing novel P2C2 technologies. While currently no P2C2 addresses all RCs, legal aspects, and practical efficiency simultaneously, QoeSiGN gives instantiation possibilities for different needs. For instance, "Multi-Party HSMs" for distributed hardware-secured computations; or secure multi-party computation (software) for highest crypto agility and user involvement, where the user participates in the QES computation. Deployment-wise, QTSPs would need to adapt the signing process and setup trusted communication channels. Legal-wise, QoeSiGN's implementation appears permissible, needing further analysis for realization. Technically, QoeSiGN addresses some regulation requirements better than the current solution, such as "sole control" or crypto agility. Our identified threats and extracted requirements can be transferred to the general QES ecosystem.
翻译:电子签名确保了数据的真实性、不可否认性和完整性。欧盟的eIDAS法规明确了高级和合格(QES)电子签名等类别。虽然电子签名的具体法律效力取决于个案,但QES在eIDAS框架下代表了最高级别的技术保护和真实性。QES基于由合格信任服务提供商(QTSP)颁发的合格证书。尽管存在法律要求,但从技术角度看,QTSP构成了单点故障。相反,隐私保护的协作计算(P2C2)近年来日益实用,但在QES领域中潜在集成的广泛研究仍显不足。我们对奥地利国家电子身份(eID)的QES创建过程进行了威胁分析,使用STRIDE和类DREAD模型提取主要涉及以下方面的需求挑战(RCs):(1)分布式服务鲁棒性,(2)敏捷密码部署,以及(3)主动用户参与。为应对这些RCs,我们提出了QoeSiGN,利用新型P2C2技术。虽然目前尚无P2C2能同时满足所有RCs、法律要求和实际效率,但QoeSiGN为不同需求提供了实例化可能性。例如,采用“多方HSM”实现分布式硬件安全计算;或使用安全多方计算(软件)实现最高密码敏捷性和用户参与,其中用户直接参与QES计算。在部署层面,QTSP需调整签名过程并建立可信通信通道。在法律层面,QoeSiGN的实施似乎可行,但需进一步分析以实现落地。从技术角度看,QoeSiGN在某些监管要求(如“独立控制”或密码敏捷性)上优于现有解决方案。我们识别的威胁和提取的需求可推广至通用QES生态系统。