The focus of this work is \emph{hardness-preserving} transformations of somewhat limited pseudorandom functions families (PRFs) into ones with more versatile characteristics. Consider the problem of \emph{domain extension} of pseudorandom functions: given a PRF that takes as input elements of some domain $U$, we would like to come up with a PRF over a larger domain. Can we do it with little work and without significantly impacting the security of the system? One approach is to first hash the larger domain into the smaller one and then apply the original PRF. Such a reduction, however, is vulnerable to a "birthday attack": after $\sqrt{\size{U}}$ queries to the resulting PRF, a collision (\ie two distinct inputs having the same hash value) is very likely to occur. As a consequence, the resulting PRF is \emph{insecure} against an attacker making this number of queries. In this work we show how to go beyond the aforementioned birthday attack barrier by replacing the above simple hashing approach with a variant of \textit{cuckoo hashing}, a hashing paradigm that resolves collisions in a table by using two hash functions and two tables, cleverly assigning each element to one of the two tables. We use this approach to obtain: (i) a domain extension method that requires {\em just two calls} to the original PRF, can withstand as many queries as the original domain size, and has a distinguishing probability that is exponentially small in the amount of non-cryptographic work; and (ii) a {\em security-preserving} reduction from non-adaptive to adaptive PRFs.
翻译:这项工作的焦点是 \ emph{ hardness- prestection} 将数量有限的伪币函数家庭( PRFs) 转换为具有更多种特性的 。 考虑伪币函数的\ emph{ domain 扩展 问题 : 如果 PRF 将某域的输入元素作为美元, 我们想要在更大的域上提出一个 PRF 。 我们能否在不做多少工作的情况下, 在不严重影响系统安全的情况下这样做? 一种方法是先将更大的域保留到小域中, 然后应用原始的 PRF 。 但是, 这样的减少很容易受到“ 原始域攻击 ” 的伤害 。 在 $\ sqrt_ sime{ {U ⁇ $ 查询后, 生成的 pRFRF 很可能发生碰撞( 有两个不同的输入值相同) 。 结果, 由此产生的 PRF 是攻击者提出这样的查询。 在这项工作中, 我们展示如何超越上述生日屏障, 取代上面的简单 { { brodal roadalteral roal rode} 。