Bitcoin uses blockchain technology to maintain transactions order and provides probabilistic guarantee to prevent double-spending, assuming that an attacker's computational power does not exceed %50 of the network power. In this paper, we design a novel bribery attack and show that this guarantee can be hugely undermined. Miners are assumed to be rational in this setup and they are given incentives that are dynamically calculated. In this attack, the adversary misuses the Bitcoin protocol to bribe miners and maximize their gained advantage. We will reformulate the bribery attack to propose a general mathematical foundation upon which we build multiple strategies. We show that, unlike Whale Attack, these strategies are practical. If the rationality assumption holds, this shows how vulnerable blockchain-based systems like Bitcoin are. We suggest a soft fork on Bitcoin to fix this issue at the end.
翻译:比特币使用链链技术来维持交易秩序,并提供防止双重支出的概率保证,假设攻击者的计算能力不超过网络功率的%50。在本文中,我们设计了一个新的贿赂攻击,并表明这种担保可能受到极大的破坏。在这种安排中,矿工被认为是合理的,他们得到的是动态计算的激励。在这次攻击中,对手滥用比特币协议来贿赂矿工并尽量扩大他们获得的优势。我们将重新定义贿赂攻击,以提出我们建立多种战略的一般数学基础。我们表明,与鲸鱼攻击不同,这些战略是实用的。如果合理性假设维持不变,这将显示Bitcoin这样的基于链的脆弱系统是多么脆弱。我们建议对比特币进行软叉,以便最终解决这个问题。