【国际】“废钞令”发布两年之后，印度无现金社会发展状况如何？

2019 年 1 月 18 日 互联网金融

两年前，印度政府突然废除了该国的大部分纸币，既希望由此发展数字支付迈向无现金社会，也希望打击黑钱和遏制腐败。那么两年时间过去了，印度政府的实验起作用了吗？

2016年11月8日晚，印度电视台发布了一则令人震惊的消息。在全国电视直播节目中，总印度理纳伦德拉·莫迪宣布，该国两种最高面额的纸币（1000卢比和500卢比）将立即从市场上收回。该计划被媒体称为废除纸币运动，计划秘密谋划，并且突然宣布，作为莫迪打击黑钱的主要措施。

这是一个大而大胆的举动，世界上任何地方在此之前都没有出现过如此大规模的突然的经济冲击。回收的纸币规模达到3200亿美元，占印度当时流通货币总值的86％。几乎一夜间纸币就变得一文不值，政府希望通过这种方式打击偷逃税款者藏匿的大笔黑钱。此外，政府声称该计划将对腐败和假钞造成重大打击，并将推动印度迈向数字化无现金国家。在一个拥有庞大的非正规经济，依赖现金交易的国家，废除纸币也是一场重大的政治赌博。

然而，政令下达之后最直接的后果就是混乱。人们冲向银行和自动取款机匆忙交换旧纸币并提取新货币。银行排起了长队；许多人遭殃，尤其是穷人，他们没有信用卡或手机钱包；据报道，由此带来的危机造成数十人死亡。

两年后，尘埃落定，很明显，废除纸币运动并没有达到政府预期会取得的巨大成功。印度的黑钱问题并没有消失。经济遭受了重创，也导致了巨大的金融损失，边缘化的穷人，最不能承受重大打击的群体，受到了严重的负面影响。税收收入有所增加，印度也已经向数字支付方向发展，但这些进步可以通过其他不那么激进的方式实现。

对于处理黑钱或促进无现金经济的国家，印度的废除纸币运动提供了丰富的经验教训。尽管在印度，废除纸币带来的长期社会，经济和政治后果仍然存在，但许多复杂问题的答案现在显而易见。

对黑钱有什么影响？

支持废除纸币运动的经济学家预测，黑钱囤积者会销毁他们藏匿的黑钱而不是宣布藏匿黑钱的地点。但在2018年8月，印度储备银行（RBI）即印度中央银行证实，99.3％的已废除的纸币已经回归到银行。几乎什么都没有消失。

显而易见，废除纸币运动并没有取得政府预期的巨大成功。

很明显，事实证明这些假设距离现实很遥远。与宝莱坞电影中的描写不同，看起来大量逃税者并没有藏匿大笔金额的现金，而是更可能将现金用来购买房地产和黄金以及存在瑞士银行的账户中。无论以什么形式持有现金，其都会重新回到银行系统。媒体报道富人以低价卖给洗钱中介，后者随后通过低收入印度人的账户将纸币存入银行系统。最终，印度储备银行没有收到任何意外收获。相反，印刷低面额纸币和管理废除纸币运动的成本给央行的收入带来了相当大的影响，其向政府支付的年度红利仅为去年的46％。收回的纸币中发现的假钞数量也很少。

废除1,000卢比和500卢比的纸币意味着通过提高囤积大笔现金的难度来表明对黑钱的强硬立场。然而，政府立即新发布了面额为2000卢比的纸币，这似乎有悖于其废除其他大面额纸币目的。印度政府没有对此举给予任何解释。在废除纸币运动的一个月内，在新印刷的货币中发现了假钞，表明假钞网络很快就进行了调整。

对经济发展带来什么影响？

在没有充分或及时补充资金的情况下，突然从印度经济中撤出现金，对农业和工业部门造成了伤害。在废除纸币运动后，对商品和服务的需求马上减少。依赖现金交易的细分市场-例如农业，有组织和无组织的零售企业，以及小微型和中型企业（MSME）部门-受到的影响最大。2017年11月，在废除纸币运动后的三个月后开展的一项针对3000个受监管的农业市场中的35种主要农产品的研究，结论认为废除大面额纸币在短期内使国内农产品贸易价值降低了15％以上，三个月以后减少了7％。2017年7月实施的全国性商品和服务税（GST）又带来了另一次重大经济破坏。

私人预测机构印度经济监测中心（CMIE）估计2017年1月至4月期间印度市场共减少了150万个工作岗位。劳动力进一步从2016-17财年的4.397亿减少到2017-18年的4.261亿。劳动力参与率（表示劳动力占劳动年龄人口的百分比）从46.1％下降到43.5％。据CMIE称，年龄在15至24岁之间的人受影响最大，可能是因为他们刚刚加入劳动力队伍，并且通常从事的是以现金支付的低技能非正规工作。

根据印度储备银行的数据，印度的GDP增长率从2015-16年的8％降至2016-17年的7.1％，至2017-18年的6.7％。政府中央统计局报告称，在2018-19财政年度（2018年4月至6月）的第一季度，由于制造业和农业部门的良好表现，印度的国内生产总值增长了8.2％。然而，以此数据来说明该国正在恢复到废除纸币之前的水平可能为时过早。金融环境不佳，油价高企以及全球经济增长放缓预计将在本财政年度下半年再次放缓GDP增速，这导致印度储备银行预测2018-19年的GDP增长率为7.4％。虽然这与世界趋势相比仍然很高，但是如果没有废除纸币运动带来的影响印度的经济表现可能会更好。

税收有所改善吗？

排除在废除纸币运动前几个月推出的税收特赦计划的影响，政府数据显示2016-17财政年度的税收没有大幅增长。然而，在下一个财政年度，纳税人和直接税的数量分别增长了10％和19％。税收增长弹性（考虑到GDP增长后的税收增长）也有所改善。财政部于2018年8月宣布，税务部门正在审查180万个账户，总额达400亿美元。然而，在一个因大规模腐败而臭名昭著的国家，审查是否会产生具体结果还有待观察。

没有复杂的经济和行为模型，很难将大赦计划、废除纸币运动、商品及服务税和税务管理改革对税收合规和税收征收剥离开来。但2017-18年的直接和间接税数据表明，印度正在走向更正式、符合税收规则的经济体的道路上。

印度是否正迈向无现金经济？

印度经济传统上一直以现金为主。根据2018年4月世界银行报告，1.9亿成年印度人没有银行账户。即使在拥有银行账户的人中，许多人仍然贫穷和文盲，无法使用信用卡或借记卡或网上银行。

在废除纸币后的几个月里，当现金无法使用时，借记卡和信用卡交易急剧增加。那些没有银行卡的人要申请新卡，但很难快速获得新卡。因为文件要求和客户审查要求较为简单，移动钱包的出现帮助弥补了这中间的缺口。Paytm是一家印度创业公司，允许用户在没有银行账户的情况下也可以注册用户，并借此机会成为了印度移动支付市场的主导力量。

虽然最初对移动钱包的热情逐渐减弱，但它推动了移动支付的应用，特别是对于低价值交易。Paytm在2018年7月宣布其拥有超过1亿活跃用户，年总交易额达500亿美元（平均交易价值为10美元）。此外，另有几家大型移动支付机构也宣布加入这张市场争夺战，并都取得了不错的业绩增长。包括可负担得起的智能手机的普及、电子商务的发展、电信和支付基础设施的改进以及多语种钱包的可用性等多种有利因素推动了印度移动钱包市场增长。

但是，移动钱包占印度零售数字交易总价值不到5％。超过85％的零售电子转账（按价值计算）是使用国家电子资金转账（NEFT）平台完成的，该平台使个人和企业能够完成银行账户间的转账。数据显示，NEFT在2016-17年业务量增长44％，2017-18年增长43％。这与过去五年中NEFT交易价值的增长一致（2013年至2018年的复合年增长率为42％）。因此，虽然印度的电子NEFT支付继续稳步增长，但废除纸币运动并没有真正加快其业务增长。

印度对现金的热爱仍然很强烈。ATM取款量在2016-17年度有所下降，但随着纸币可以再次自由使用，ATM取款量有所提升。2018年7月普华永道关于印度的ATM报告显示，从2017年4月到2018年3月，ATM交易价值的平均环比增长率为1.16％，而2014年5月至2016年10月的平均值为1.04％（废除纸币前）。根据印度储备银行，2017-18年流通货币增长率为37％，货币对GDP比率从8.8％增加到10.9％。以大规模现金交易而闻名的房地产行业在废除纸币运动后立即遭遇重大挫折，但现在现金已开始用于房地产和土地交易。

从数据中可以得出结论，印度正在走向数字支付之路，其中废除纸币运动提供了积极的推动力。但现金仍是王者；许多印度人仍处于数字交易的范围之外。

普通人怎么样？

一些学者和活动家记录了废除纸币对农村贫困人口的影响。一项研究印度南部泰米尔纳德邦10个村庄的492户家庭报告称，在废除纸币运动后，超过三分之一的受访者的工作变少了。农业工人和自营职业者受到的影响最大。有几个人报告说他们永远失去的工作或经营出现损失，因为他们被更适应无现金经济的竞争对手所取代。随着现金的消失，人们更加依赖朋友和家人的网络来维持他们的经济和社会活动。非正规债务急剧增加。加上印度的国家保障措施薄弱，导致那些没有这种上述家族支持的人受到的影响最大。

2016年12月和2017年2月对位于孟买28个贫民窟社区的200户家庭进行的一项调查显示，40％的家庭因废除纸币而失去了约40％的月收入。与此同时，消费和储蓄减少，家庭债务增加，偿还债务的能力恶化。受访者表示越来越多的人接受无现金支付方式，但现金仍然是首选的支付方式。对不同储蓄方式的态度发生了显着变化，受访者表示他们在家中持有现金的意愿降低。尽管有收入损失，但在2017年2月初，51％的被调查样本对废除纸币运动感到乐观，认为这是为了国家的利益，而22％的人持否定意见。

政治上的影响如何？

莫迪的印度人民党（BJP）于2014年上台，获得了压倒性的多数席位，允许他以废除纸币的方式进行政治赌博。如果黑钱确实大幅减少，那么莫迪就会成为穷人的捍卫者，并巩固了其所在的印度人民党对选民的控制。然而，废除纸币运动并没有取得预期效果，也削弱了莫迪作为一个完美领导者的形象。尽管如此，人民党在2017年和2018年进入民意调查的12个州中，仍然在8个州赢得了议会选举。似乎糟糕的经济表现以及废除纸币运动和GST的冲击都无法阻碍人民党成为领导印度的执政党。

最终裁决

印度政府于2018年8月发布了一份新闻声明，声称废除纸币运动是成功的。但事实却并非如此。

如果废除纸币运动的目标是减少黑钱，那么逐渐并稳步地废除大面额纸币可能会更好地达到目的。如果目标是使国家更加符合税收标准，那么在税收管理方面的改革，提高流程自动化以及特赦计划和客户教育方面进行改革本来会更好。有些人认为税务部门现在掌握有关谁有钱的信息，因此废除纸币有助于找到那些逃税的人。但是为了利用这些信息，印度就需要无腐败、有效的税收管理（这是莫迪寻求纠正的原始问题的一部分）。全国范围的商品及服务税在将更多人纳入税收网络，增加直接和间接税收方面取得的成功，证明有更好的方法来实现这一目标。印度现在正朝着无现金交易的方向发展。然而，在废除纸币运动之前，政府一直在采取措施推行数字化。Aadhaar（每个印度人的唯一识别号码），Jan Dhan（全能银行），UPI（统一支付界面）以及许多其他举措已经在进行中。考虑到社会最底层群体的需要，最好逐步推行这些计划。

在一个非常非正规的经济体中，很多穷苦的民众仍然无法使用数字支付服务，因此废除纸币运动是一种考虑不周的激进措施，对印度经济造成了很大的破坏。在废除纸币运动两周年之际，废除纸币带来的好处似乎并不值得为此付出巨大的经济损失以及由此带来的痛苦。

英文原文

On the night of Nov. 8, 2016, there was a surprise announcement on Indian television. In a live telecast to the nation, Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that the country’s two highest-denomination currency notes (Rs 1,000 and Rs 500) would be withdrawn immediately from the market. The plan, termed demonetization by the press, was planned in secrecy and announced dramatically, as Modi’s masterstroke against black money.

As economic experiments go, it was a big, bold move. There was no precedent, anywhere in the world, for a sudden economic shock of this scale. The withdrawn notes, amounting to US$320 billion at the time, represented 86 percent of the total currency value in circulation in India. By making the notes worthless almost overnight, the government hoped to destroy large piles of black money hidden away by tax evaders. In addition, the government claimed the plan would strike a major blow against corruption and counterfeiting and would kick-start India’s transition into a digital, cashless world. In a country with a huge informal economy, dependent on cash transactions, demonetization was a big political gamble, too.

The immediate fallout was chaos, as the country scrambled to cope. There was a rush at banks and ATMs to exchange old notes and withdraw new currency. Queues at banks grew; many people suffered, especially the poor, who had no access to credit cards or mobile wallets; and dozens of deaths resulting from the crisis were reported.

Two years later, the dust has settled, and it has become obvious that demonetization was not the resounding success the government expected it to be. India’s black money problem has not gone away. The economy has taken a beating, huge financial losses have been incurred, and the marginalized poor, least able to withstand adversity, have been negatively affected. There have been some gains in tax collections, and the country has progressed toward digital payments, but these advances could have been achieved through other, less drastic means.

For countries tackling black money or promoting a cashless economy, India’s experience with demonetization provides rich lessons. Although the long-term social, economic, and political consequences of demonetization are still playing out in India, answers to many complex questions are now apparent.

What Happened to the Black Money?

Economists who supported demonetization predicted that black money hoarders would destroy their stashes rather than declare them, thus delivering a bottom-line bonanza to the country. But in August 2018, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the country’s central bank, confirmed that 99.3 percent of the demonetized notes had been returned to the banks. Almost nothing was extinguished.

Clearly, assumptions proved to be far from reality. Unlike portrayals in Bollywood films, it appeared that big tax evaders had not stashed away bundles of cash, but more likely held their money in real estate, gold, and Swiss bank accounts. Whatever was held in cash found its way back into the banking system. The press reported that the wealthy sold their currency at discounted rates to money-laundering intermediaries, who then deposited the notes into the banking system through the accounts of low-income Indians. Ultimately, the RBI did not receive any windfall. Instead, the cost of printing lower-denomination notes and managing the demonetization exercise put a sizeable dent in the central bank’s coffers, reducing its annual dividend to 46 percent of what it paid the government the previous year. There was very little counterfeit currency detected among the notes returned.

The withdrawal of Rs 1,000 and Rs 500 notes was meant to signal a tough stance against black money by making it difficult to hoard large sums of cash. However, the government immediately introduced a new Rs 2,000 note, which seemed to defeat the purpose of eliminating the other high-denomination notes. The government offered no explanation for the move. And counterfeits were detected in the newly printed currency within a month of demonetization, suggesting that the counterfeiting network quickly adapted.

What Happened to Economic Growth?

The abrupt withdrawal of cash from India’s economy, without adequate or timely replenishment, hurt the farming and industrial sectors. Demand for goods and services fell immediately after demonetization. Segments that relied on cash transactions — such as agriculture, organized and unorganized retail, and the micro, small, and medium enterprise (MSME) sector — suffered most. A November 2017 study of 3,000 regulated agricultural markets for 35 major agricultural commodities, conducted during the three months immediately following demonetization, concluded that eliminating the high-currency notes had reduced the value of domestic agricultural trade by more than 15 percent in the short run, settling at 7 percent reduction three months later. The implementation of a nationwide goods and services tax (GST) in July 2017 provided yet another major economic disruption.

The Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), a private forecaster, estimated that 1.5 million jobs were lost between January and April 2017. The labor force further shrank from 439.7 million in the fiscal year 2016–17 to 426.1 million in 2017–18. And the labor force participation rate (which expresses the labor force as a percentage of the working-age population) fell from 46.1 percent to 43.5 percent. According to CMIE, those ages 15 to 24 were the most affected, probably because they were relatively new to the workforce and typically held low-skilled, informal jobs paid by cash.

According to the RBI, India’s GDP growth rate slowed from 8 percent in 2015–16 to 7.1 percent in 2016–17, to 6.7 percent in 2017–18. And the Central Statistics Office of the Government reported that during the first quarter of the fiscal year 2018–19 (April to June 2018), India’s GDP registered growth of 8.2 percent, on the back of a good performance by the manufacturing and farming sectors. However, it might be premature to celebrate this as an indicator that the country is bouncing back to pre-demonetization levels. Tighter financial conditions, high oil prices, and slowing global growth are expected to slow GDP growth again in the second half of this fiscal year, which has led the RBI to forecast GDP growth at 7.4 percent for 2018–19. Although this is still high compared with world trends, the country’s economic performance would have been better without the dampening effects of demonetization.

Did Tax Collections Improve?

Excluding the effects of a tax amnesty plan launched months before demonetization, government data shows there was no major growth in tax collections in the 2016–17 financial year. In the next financial year, though, both the number of taxpayers and direct tax collections grew significantly, by 10 percent and 19 percent, respectively. Tax buoyancy (tax collection growth after factoring in GDP growth) also improved. The Finance Ministry announced in August 2018 that the tax department was scrutinizing 1.8 million accounts, totaling $40 billion. However, in a country notorious for large-scale corruption, it remains to be seen whether the scrutiny will yield concrete results.

Without complex economic and behavioral modeling, it’s difficult to isolate the effect of amnesty plans, demonetization, GST, and tax administration reforms on tax compliance and collections. But direct and indirect tax data for 2017–18 suggests that India is making progress on the path to a more formal, tax-compliant economy.

Did India Move Closer to a Cashless Economy?

The Indian economy traditionally has been dominated by cash. According to an April 2018 World Bank report (pdf), 190 million adult Indians do not have bank accounts. Even among those with bank accounts, many are still poor and illiterate, with no access to credit or debit cards or Internet banking.

In the months following demonetization, when cash became unavailable, there was a sharp rise in debit and credit card transactions. Those who did not have cards applied for them, but it was difficult to get new cards quickly. Mobile wallets, with simpler documentation and Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements, stepped in to bridge the gap. Paytm, an Indian startup, quickly became the market leader, allowing merchants to register even without a bank account.

Although initial enthusiasm for mobile wallets has tapered off, it sparked adoption of mobile payments, particularly for low-value transactions. Paytm announced in July 2018 that it had more than 100 million active users, with gross transactions totaling $50 billion in a year (with an average transaction value of $10). Several other big players have entered the market and reported strong growth. Multiple tailwinds — the increased penetration of affordable smartphones, the growth of e-commerce, improvements in telecom and payment infrastructure, and the availability of multilingual wallets — are pushing this growth in mobile wallets.

However, mobile wallets represent less than 5 percent of the total value of retail digital transactions in India. More than 85 percent of retail electronic transfers (in terms of value) are done using the National Electronic Funds Transfer (NEFT) platform, which enables individuals and businesses to transfer funds across bank accounts. NEFT showed growth of 44 percent in 2016–17 and 43 percent in 2017–18. This is in keeping with the increasing value of NEFT transactions over the last five years (with a CAGR of 42 percent from 2013 to 2018). So, it appears that although electronic NEFT payments continue to grow steadily in India, demonetization has not really accelerated the rate of growth.

India’s love affair with cash also remains strong. ATM withdrawals dropped in 2016–17, but picked up pace when currency was freely available again. A July 2018 PwC report (pdf) on ATMs in India shows that from April 2017 to March 2018, the average month-on-month growth in ATM transaction values was 1.16 percent, compared with 1.04 percent from May 2014 to October 2016 (pre-demonetization). According to the RBI, currency in circulation grew by 37 percent in 2017–18, and the currency-to-GDP ratio increased from 8.8 percent to 10.9 percent. The real estate sector, known for large cash transactions, experienced a major setback immediately after demonetization, but cash has now begun to make its appearance in property and land deals.

It is reasonable to conclude from the data that India is on a journey toward digital payments, with demonetization providing a positive nudge. But cash remains king; and many Indians remain outside the ambit of digital transactions.

What About the Common Person?

In the days after demonetization was announced, the press carried harrowing stories of human suffering. The shortage of cash resulted in medical and personal emergencies. Several tragedies were reported. The prime minister appeared on television, acknowledging the anguish, and called on the people to join him on a mahayagna, a grand sacrifice to rid India of corruption. It appeared that many Indians bought into the idea of a war on corruption. Even through many days of widespread distress, there were no major riots or violent incidents.

Several academicians and activists documented the impact of demonetization on the rural poor. A study of 492 households from 10 villages in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu reported that more than one-third of those surveyed had less work after demonetization. Agricultural wage workers and the self-employed suffered the greatest effects. Several people reported permanent loss of work, or loss of markets, as they were replaced by competitors who adapted better to being cashless. As cash disappeared, people relied more strongly on networks of friends and family to sustain their economic and social activities. Informal debt rose sharply. Those without such support networks suffered the most, particularly because state social protection is weak in India and governmental programs are notoriously subject to patronage.

A survey of 200 families living in 28 slum neighborhoods in Mumbai, conducted in December 2016 and February 2017, showed that 40 percent of households reported losing about 40 percent of their monthly income due to demonetization. Consumption and savings decreased, household debt increased, and the ability to repay debt worsened. Respondents reported an increased acceptance of cashless payment methods, but cash remained the preferred payment form. The attitude toward different forms of savings changed significantly, with respondents showing a decreased willingness to hold cash at home. In spite of income losses, at the beginning of February 2017, 51 percent of the sample surveyed felt positive about demonetization, feeling it was for the good of the country, while 22 percent had a negative opinion.

What Were the Political Implications?

Modi’s Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) came to power in 2014 with a strong majority mandate, allowing him to take a political gamble with demonetization. If black money had indeed been extinguished in a significant way, it would have established Modi as a champion of the poor and consolidated his party’s hold on the electorate. Demonetization turned out to be a damp squib, though, and dented Modi’s image as a leader who could do no wrong. Nonetheless, the BJP won assembly elections in eight of the 12 states that went to the polls in 2017 and 2018. It seems that neither poor economic performance nor the combined shocks of demonetization and GST have halted BJP’s journey toward becoming India’s leading national party.

The Final Verdict

The Indian government issued a press statement in August 2018, claiming that demonetization was a success. The facts do not support the claim.

If the goal of demonetization was to reduce black money, a gradual and steady withdrawal of high-denomination notes would have perhaps served the purpose better. If the objective was to make the country more tax-compliant, then it would have been better to pursue administrative reforms in taxation and increased automation of processes, along with amnesty plans and customer education. Some argue that the Tax Department now has information about who has money, and thus demonetization can help find those guilty of tax evasion. But to make use of this information, the country needs corruption-free, effective tax administration (which was part of the original problem Modi sought to correct). The success of the nationwide GST in bringing more people under the tax net, and increasing both direct and indirect tax collections, is proof that there are better ways to bell the cat. India is now moving faster toward cashless transactions. However, the government had been making moves to digitize before demonetization. Aadhaar (a unique identification number for each Indian), Jan Dhan (universal banking), UPI (unified payments interface), and many other initiatives were already underway. It would have been better to push through those plans gradually, bearing in mind the needs of the weakest sections of society.

In a largely informal economy where the most vulnerable people still have no access to digital payments, demonetization was an ill-considered, draconian measure that did a lot of damage to the Indian economy. At the end of two years, the benefits do not seem to have been worth the enormous financial losses and suffering.

译者：刘斌，赵云德

来源：移动支付网