In recent years, multiparty computation as a service (MPCaaS) has gained popularity as a way to build distributed privacy-preserving systems. We argue that for many such applications, we should also require that the MPC protocol is publicly auditable, meaning that anyone can check the given computation is carried out correctly -- even if the server nodes carrying out the computation are all corrupt. In a nutshell, the way to make an MPC protocol auditable is to combine an underlying MPC protocol with verifiable computing proof (in particular, a SNARK). Building a general-purpose MPCaaS from existing constructions would require us to perform a costly "trusted setup" every time we wish to run a new or modified application. To address this, we provide the first efficient construction for auditable MPC that has a one-time universal setup. Despite improving the trusted setup, we match the state-of-the-art in asymptotic performance: the server nodes incur a linear computation overhead and constant round communication overhead compared to the underlying MPC, and the audit size and verification are logarithmic in the application circuit size. We also provide an implementation and benchmarks that support our asymptotic analysis in example applications. Furthermore, compared with existing auditable MPC protocols, besides offering a universal setup our construction also has a 3x smaller proof, 3x faster verification time and comparable prover time.
翻译:近些年来,多党计算作为一种服务(MPCaaaS)作为建立分布式隐私保护系统的一种方式,越来越受欢迎。我们认为,对于许多此类应用程序,我们还应该要求多党协议可以公开审计,这意味着任何人都可以正确检查特定计算,即使进行计算服务的服务器节点腐败。简言之,使多党协议可以审计的方法是将一个基本的MPC协议与可核查的计算证明(特别是SNARK)结合起来。从现有的建筑中建立通用的MPCaaS需要我们执行一个昂贵的“受信任的设置”每一个我们希望运行新的或修改应用程序的时间都要进行。为了解决这个问题,我们为具有一次性全局性设置的可审计的MPC提供了第一个高效的构建。尽管改进了可信任的设置,但我们匹配了目前最先进的功能:服务器节点产生线性计算间接费用和不间断的循环通信管理费,而审计规模和核查在应用程序中是比较的逻辑设置的,我们还提供了比目前更小的时间框架。