In this paper, we introduce a game that allows one to assess the potential loss of efficiency induced by a decentralized control or local management of a global epidemic. Each player typically represents a region or a country which is assumed to choose its control action to implement a tradeoff between socioeconomic aspects and the health aspect. We conduct the Nash equilibrium analysis of this game. Since the analysis is not trivial in general, sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. Then we quantify through numerical results the loss induced by decentralization, measured in terms of price of anarchy (PoA) and price of connectedness (PoC). These results allow one to clearly identify scenarios where decentralization is acceptable or not regarding to the retained global efficiency measures.
翻译:在本文中,我们引入了一种游戏,使人们可以评估分散控制或地方管理全球流行病可能造成的效率损失。每个参与者通常代表一个区域或一个国家,假定一个国家选择其控制行动,以在社会经济方面和健康方面进行权衡。我们对这一游戏进行纳什平衡分析。由于分析一般不是微不足道的,因此提供了存在和独特性的充分条件。然后,我们通过数字结果量化了权力下放引起的损失,以无政府状态的价格和关联性的价格来衡量。这些结果使人们可以清楚地确定权力下放可以接受或不能接受保留的全球效率措施。