As Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are increasingly being deployed, situations frequently arise where multiple stakeholders must reconcile preferences to control a shared resource. We perform a 5-month long experiment dubbed 'smartSDH' (carried out in 27 employees' office space) where users report their preferences for the brightness of overhead lighting. smartSDH implements a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism; assuming users are rational, it incentivizes truthful reporting, implements the socially desirable outcome, and compensates participants to ensure higher payoffs under smartSDH when compared with the default outside option(i.e., the option chosen in the absence of such a mechanism). smartSDH assesses the feasibility of the VCG mechanism in the context of smart building control and evaluated smartSDH's effect using metrics such as light level satisfaction, incentive satisfaction, and energy consumption. Although previous studies on the theoretical aspects of the mechanism indicate user satisfaction, our experiments indicate quite the contrary. We found that the participants were significantly less satisfied with light brightness and incentives determined by the VCG mechanism over time. These data suggest the need for more realistic behavioral models to design IoT technologies and highlights difficulties in estimating preferences from observable external factors such as atmospheric conditions.
翻译:随着互联网(IoT)技术的日益应用,经常出现多种利益攸关方必须调和各种偏好以控制共享资源的情况。我们进行了为期5个月的名为“SmartSDH”(在27个雇员的办公空间里运行)的长期实验,用户在实验中报告他们喜欢高压照明。智能SDH采用了经修改的Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)机制;假设用户是合理的,它鼓励真实报告,执行社会可取的结果,并补偿参与者确保智能SDH下与缺省外部选项(即,在没有这种机制的情况下选择的选择)相比的回报率更高。智能SDH在5个月的时间里进行了试验,用户在智能建筑控制的背景下报告他们喜欢高亮度的灯光亮度。智能SDHDH采用了一个修改后的Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)机制(VCG)机制;智能SDHDH(VCG)机制的理论方面研究显示用户满意度,但我们的实验表明恰恰相反,参与者对智能SDH机制确定的亮亮度和激励度和激励因素在时间里显示,这些数据显示ICGFSDH的外部模型需要更现实性地评估。这些数据显示,因为I-SDHDHDMisabisl的精确性技术的精确性选择。