We propose a new method to protect Over-The-Air (OTA) computation schemes against passive eavesdropping. Our method uses a friendly jammer whose signal is -- contrary to common intuition -- stronger at the legitimate receiver than it is at the eavesdropper. It works for a large class of analog OTA computation schemes and we give details on the special case of computing an arithmetic average over an AWGN channel. The derived secrecy guarantee translates to a lower bound on the eavesdropper's mean square error while the question of how to provide operationally more significant guarantees such as semantic security remains open for future work. The key ingredients in proving the security guarantees are a known result on channel resolvability and a generalization of existing achievability results on coding for compound channels.
翻译:我们提议了一种新的方法来保护Air(OTA)的计算计划,防止被动窃听。我们的方法使用一个友好的干扰器,其信号在合法接收器比窃听器更强 -- -- 与普通直觉相反 -- -- 其信号在合法接收器比在窃听器更强。它适用于一大批模拟OTA计算计划,我们详细介绍了在AWGN频道上计算算术平均值的特殊案例。衍生的保密保证对窃听器的中正方错误的约束力较低,而如何提供更为重要的操作性保障,例如语义安全的问题仍然对未来工作开放。证明安全保障的关键因素是频道可解性以及复合频道编码现有可实现结果的普及。