Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we lose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.
翻译:立法委员会或股东会议上的二进制是零决定,通常模拟为加权游戏,但也有值得注意的例外。例如,欧洲理事会根据《里斯本条约》制定的表决规则采用了更为复杂的结构。在这里,我们想研究一个问题,即如果我们把自己限制在加权游戏上,我们是否从实际角度损失了很多。为此,我们引用能衡量一成员在二进制决策委员会中影响力的权力指数。更确切地说,我们比较加权游戏的可实现的权力分配与合理超重游戏的可实现的权力分配。结果发现偏差相对较小。