This paper describes two basic queueing models of service platforms in digital sharing economy by means of two different policies of platform matching information. We show that the two queueing models of service platforms can be expressed as the level-independent quasi birth-and-death (QBD) processes. Using the proposed QBD processes, we provide a detailed analysis for the two queueing models of service platforms, including the system stability, the average stationary numbers of seekers and of idle owners, the expected sojourn time of an arriving seeker, and the expected profits for both the service platform and each owner. Finally, numerical examples are employed to verify our theoretical results, and demonstrate how the performance measures of service platforms are influenced by some key system parameters. We believe that the methodology and results developed in this paper not only can be applied to develop a broad class of queuing models of service platforms, but also will open a series of promising innovative research on performance evaluation, optimal control and queueing-game of service platforms and digital sharing economy.
翻译:本文通过两种不同的平台匹配信息政策,描述了数字共享经济服务平台的两个基本排队模式。我们展示了两种排队模式,即服务平台的两个排队模式,可以表现为低等独立准生死(QBD)流程。我们使用拟议的QBD流程,对两种排队模式提供了详细分析,包括系统稳定性、申请人和闲置业主的平均固定人数、抵达寻求者预期的逗留时间以及服务平台和所有者的预期利润。最后,我们采用了数字示例来核实我们的理论结果,并展示服务平台的业绩计量如何受到某些关键系统参数的影响。我们认为,本文中制定的方法和结果不仅可以用于开发一系列广泛的服务平台排队模式,而且还将启动一系列有希望的创新研究,涉及服务平台的业绩评估、最佳控制和排队游戏以及数字共享经济。